Kafader v. Baumann Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39195 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-29-2012
Kafader v. Baumann Respondent's Brief Dckt.
39195
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Kafader v. Baumann Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39195" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3394.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3394
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT NO. 39195-2011 
DONETTALKAFADER ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
KIMBERLY A. BAUMANN ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
for the County of Twin Falls 
Honorable Randy J. Stoker, Presiding 
ERIC R. CLARK 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
MICHAELE. KELLY, ISB#4351 
NATHAN S. OHLER, ISB #8502 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
413 W. Idaho Street - Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 856 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Tables of Cases and Authorities ................................................. 11 
Nature of the Case ........................................................... 1 
Course of Proceedings Below ................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts ......................................................... 2 
Standard of Review ........................................................... 3 
Respondent's Restatement of the Issues that Have Been Presented on Appeal 
by the Appellant and the Respondent's Request for an Award of 
Costs and Attorney's Fees on Appeal ............................................. 4 
Argument .................................................................. 4 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Appellant's 
Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5). ... 5 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Appellant's 
Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) ...... 8 
e. This Court Should Deny Appellant's Request for Attorneys' Fees 
Pursuant to I.e. § 12-121 and Instead Award Baumann Attorneys' Fees 10 
Conclusion ................................................................ 11 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 536, 903 P.2d 110, 125 (App. 1995) .................... 7,8 
Dinneen v. Finch 100 Idaho 620,626,603 P.2d 575,561 (1979) ......................... 8 
Harger v. Teton Springs Golf & Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716, 719, 184 
P.3d 841,844 (2008) ........................................................... 9 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 773, 727 P.2d 1187, 1201 (1986) ....................... 5 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 768, 727 P.2d at 1196, 
quoting U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) ................................ 9 
Painter v. Spain, M.D., 138 Idaho 798,800,69 P.3d 1059, 1061 (2003); ................ 3,4 
Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230, 237, 244 (2003) .................... , 11 
Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Dept., 
142 Idaho 826, 833, 136 P.3d 297,304 (2006) ....................................... 9 
Sheridan v. St. Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 780, 25 P.3d 88,93 (2001) .......... 3 
Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho at 788,25 P.3d at 101 ............................. 8, 10 
Teton Springs v. VR. Invests., 145 Idaho 716,718-19. . ............................... 5 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTION 
Idaho Code §12-121 ...................................................... 4,10,11 
COURT RULES 
I.R.c.P. § 59(a)(5) ................................................... 1,4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
I.R.C.P. § 59(a)(6) ...................................................... 1,4,8, 10 
I.R.C.P. § 68 .................................................................. 1 
I.R.C.P. § 59.1 ..................................................... : .......... 5 
ii 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of the jury trial of a lawsuit stemming from a low-impact rear end 
automobile collision in which Appellant sustained only soft tissue damage to neck. Appellant 
now challenges the District Court's denial of her Motion for Additur or in Alternative Trial. 
After a two day jury trial, the Appellant sought relief pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil I-'rc\r'''''' 
59(a)(5) and (6), contending that the jury should have awarded her more money. In a fourteen (14) 
page Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Additur and in the Alternative 
for a New Trial ("Order"), the District Court rejected Appellant's arguments. This appeal followed. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellant commenced this negligence action on October 7,20] 0 in the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, County of Twin Falls. R., 8. A pretrial hearing was held on July 5, 2011, 
where the District Court granted Respondent Kimberly Baumann's (hereinafter "Baumann" or 
Respondent) Motion to Allow the Videotaped Trial Testimony of Richard Knoebel, 
Alternatively, Motion for Continuance. R, 179-83. The videotaped deposition of Dr. was 
taken on July 13,2011. Supp. Transcript on Appeal, at 4. More than fourteen (14) days trial, 
Baumann served on the Appellant a $25,000 offer of judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68. R, 289-291. Appellant did not accept the offer of judgment. R, 342-44. 
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A two day jury trial was held on July 19 and 20, 2011; the Honorable Randy J. Stoker, 
District Judge, presided. Transcript on Appeal. The only issues tried were causation and damages. 
R.,335. The jury awarded Appellant $2,787.50 in economic damages and $15,000 in non-economic 
general damages. R.,336. A judgement was entered on July 26,2011. R.,263-264. After the trial, 
both parties sought recovery of their trial costs and the Appellant filed a Motion for Additur and in 
the Alternative Motion for New Trial. The District Court denied Plaintiff' 
in the Alternative Motion for New Trial and awarded net costs to the Defendant in 
$1,988.41. R.,344. An amended judgment was entered on August 23,201 L 
C. STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS 
and 
amount of 
This is a personal injury lawsuit resulting from a low-impact automobile collision that 
occurred in Kimberly, Idaho, on October 20, 2008 (hereinafter the "Accident"). Transcript on 
Appeal, 88-9. Baumann rear-ended the Appellant at a speed of approximately 10-15 mph. 
Transcript on Appeal, 89. The Appellant did not seek medical attention at the scene of the Accident, 
but went to the emergency room for lower back pain later in the day after of the accident. Transcript 
on Appeal, 211. 
The Appellant confirmed during the trial that she first sought treatment forming 
the primary basis of her damage claim, pain in her upper back and cervical area, a couple 
after the Accident. Transcript on Appeal, 212. Subsequently, the Appellant began obtaining 
treatment from chiropractor Dr. Brad Turner, and then approximately six months after the Accident 
from neurologist, Dr. Hammond. Transcript on Appeal, 113. 
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Thejury heard evidence about the Appellant' s medical history, which included several prior 
back surgeries, pre-existing neck cervical pain and fibromyalgia. Transcript on Appeal, 100-04,303, 
162-63, 315, 168, 175; R. 333. Appellant described how, after the Accident, she was injured in a 
Winco parking lot, and, as a result, had commenced a personal injury lawsuit arising from that 
incident. Transcript on Appeal 242-57. During cross-examination, Appellant recounted how the 
injuries she sustained in the Winco incident affected her life in ways that significantly accorded with 
how the injuries caused by the Accident affected her life. Transcript on Appeal 
At trial, Baumann presented the videotaped controversy of Dr. Richard Knoebel. Supp. 
Transcript on Appeal. In contrast to the testimony of Appellant's medical witnesses, Dr. Knoebel 
testified that the Appellant did not sustain significant, permanent or long-term injury, and that 
Appellants' Complaints were more likely consistent with her preexisting pain complaints. SUpp. 
Transcript on Appeal, 9-10,13-15. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews a District Court's ruling on a motion for new trial an abuse of 
discretion. See Palmer v. Spain, M.D., 138 Idaho 798, 800,69 P.3d 1059, 1061 (2003); see also 
Sheridan v. St. Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 780, P.3d 1). Unless the 
District Court abused its discretion, this Court affirms the District Court's ruling. Sheridan v. 
S1. Lukes Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho at 780,25 P.3d at 93. In reviewing a discretionary matter, this 
Court performs a three part analysis to determine if the District Court: (l) "corrected perceived the 
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issue as discretionary; (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." See Palmer v. 
Spain, M.D., 138 Idaho at 800,69 P.3d at 1061. 
II. 
RESPONDENT'S RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES THAT 
HAVE BEEN PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY THE APPELLANT 
AND THE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR AN A ';YARD 0 F 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5)? 
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6)? 
3. Is Respondent entitled to award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
In this instance, the District Court correctly perceived that the decision to grant a Motion for 
New Trial Brought Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) and (6) is a matter of discretion. 
See R. 336, 338. Therefore, the analysis turns to whether the District Court acted within the bounds 
of its considerable discretion in reaching its decision, and whether it exercised reason 
its decision. Palmer v. Spain, M.D., 138 Idaho at 800, 69 P.3d at 1061. As discussed below, it is 
evident the District Court acted within its discretion in reaching its decision, and manifestly 
exercised a high level of reason in denying Appellants' Motion for Additur and in the Alternative 
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for a New Trial. 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Appellant's Motion for 
New Trial Brought Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S9(a)(S). 
The Appellant moved for a new trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5), 
which authorizes the District Court to grant a new trial for "inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." lRCP.59(a)(5). The District Court also 
may conditionally grant a new trial subject to additur. See lRCP. 59.1. 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5), the District Court "must weigh the evidence 
and then compare the jury's award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the 
disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand." Teton Springs v. V.R. Invests., 145 Idaho 716, 
718-19. In lUling on a motion for a new trial, the district court should distinguish the grounds upon 
which it is based. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 773, 727 P.2d 1187, 1201 (1986). Although 
less explanation is required in denying a motion for new trial than in granting one, the trial court still 
must identify "where in the record it reveals, that the moving party has failed to meets its burden to 
justify granting the motion." See id., 111 Idaho at 773, 727 P.2d at 1201. 
Here, the District Court weighed the evidence, compared the jury's award to what the District 
Court would have awarded if there was no trial, and concluded the "verdict was not so disparate with 
a reasonable view of the evidence as to suggest an award under the 'influence of passion or 
prejudice'." R, 340. In so doing, the District Court pointed to various parts of the record that 
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revealed why the Appellant failed to establish the jury's verdict was "given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice" see Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5), and observed that the jury's 
$15,000 award of general damages was in line with what the Court would have awarded at a bench 
trial, "given the finding that the cervical injury was not permanent." R., 340. 
As to the purported "permanence" of the Appellant's injury, the District Court that 
the evidence was "highly contested." For example, Baumann's expert, Dr. Knoebel, testified 
Appellant sustained "no significant injury or long-term permanent injury" as a ofthe 
Supp. Transcript on Appeal, 9-10, 13-15. Dr. Knoebel added that Appellant' "chronic pain 
complaints are most consistent with her preexisting chronic pain complaints," including 
fibromyalgia, and "not the motor vehicle accident." Supp. Transcript on Appeal, 9-10, 13-15. From 
the evidence the jury heard, the District Court reasoned that it could reasonably conclude the 
Appellant's cervical injury was not permanent. R.,339. The District Court also observed that the 
jury heard evidence from which it could conclude the motor vehicle accident was minor. R., 340. 
Moreover, the District Court pointed out that the jury heard evidence the Appellant had a 
preexisting lower back condition and "numerous medical issues ... including disputed 
testimony about whether Plaintiff had pre-existing fibromyalgia." cross-
examination, and contrary to Appellant's representation that there was "no medical that 
established or corroborated either an accurate diagnosis of fibromyalgia or any ongoing treatment 
for the condition," see Appellant's Brief at 16, Appellant's own neurologist conceded that he 
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prescribed her "Cymbalta ... for the fibromyalgia aspects of her symptoms." See Transcript on 
Appeal, at 175. The same neurologist admitted that the Federal Drug Administration approved 
another drug prescribed the Appellant, Savella, "strictly" for fibromyalgia. See Transcript on 
Appeal, at 303; 162-63. Then Dr. Hammond equivocated about whether he really ever treated the 
Appellant for fibromyalgia, stating that the "reason" he reported fibromyalgia in his 
records was to "try and get her medical coverage to pay for it." See Transcript on Appeal, at 3 I 5; 
168; 175. The jury heard ample evidence that Appellant was treated 
fibromyalgia. 
Appellant's apparent contention that the District Court should have expressly found 
Plaintiff's medical service providers more credible and, as a result, reversed the jury's decision, 
misapprehends the judge's role in deciding a 59(a)(5) motion. First, as the District Court noted, 
there was evidence in the record challenging the credibility and biases of the medical witnesses, 
which would include Appellants'. R., 341. Second, it is "a jury function to set the damage award 
based on its sense of fairness and justice" and the "trial judge must defer to the jury, unless it is 
apparent to the trial judge that there was a great disparity" between the jury's what the 
trial judge would have awarded such that it "shocks the conscience" or is Ul1(::OflSCllOna!J1 
v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 536, 903 P.2d 110, 125 (App. 1995). In this case, 
expressly stated that the $2,787.50 in special damages was consistent with a finding that 
Appellant's cervical injury was not permanent. R., 339. This conclusion was buttressed by the fact 
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that Appellant's medical services witnesses offered no testimony as to how to apportion damages 
between Appellant's extensive preexisting injuries and those caused by the Accident. R., 339. 
Moreover, the District Court observed that the $15,000 award in general damages was consistent 
with the evidence the jury heard. R.,340. 
Simply put, the District Court's analysis denying the Appellant'S Motion for New Trial 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) was within the outer bounds of the court's permissible 
discretion and well-reasoned. See Beale v. Speck, 1271daho at 536, 903 P.2d 110 at 1 (affirming 
District Court's denial of motion for new trial under Rule 59(a)(5) based on disputed evidence that 
failed to "shock the conscience" or appeared to have been the result of "passion or prejudice"). This 
case involved hotly disputed evidence and impeached witnesses. As such, this case is factually 
distinguishable from Dinneen v. Finch, where the defendant failed to controvert the Plaintiff's 
evidence of personal injury, lost wages and personal property. See 100 Idaho 620, 626, 603 P.2d 
575,561 (1979). Therefore, the rule that ajury or fact-finder must accept as true the uncontradicted 
testimony of unimpeached witnesses is inapplicable. See id. 100 Idaho at 626-27, 603 P.2d at 561-
62. There is no manifest abuse of the District Court's wide discretion. Sheridan v. Jmnbura, 
135 Idaho at 788,25 P.3d at 101. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denving Appellant's :Motion for 
New Trial Brought Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6), the District Court "must weight the evidence 
and determine (1) whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; 
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and (2) whether a new trial would produce a different result." Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Idaho Transportation Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 833, 136 P.3d 297,304 (2006); see also Harger v. Teton 
Springs Golf & Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716,719,184 P.3d 841,844 (2008). "If, having given full 
respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new triaL" 
Quick v. Crane, III Idaho at 768,727 P.2d at 1196, quoting U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 
( 1948). 
Applying these principles, it is evident the District Court did not abuse its wide discretion 
in denying the Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). 
The District Court's Memorandum Decision spent approximately three pages summarizing the 
evidence submitted by both parties to the jury. R.,332-335. Based on that evidence, the Court could 
not "say that the jury's verdict in this case is against the clear weight of the evidence." R., 341. The 
District Court reiterated that the pivotal issue was whether Appellant proved that her injury was 
permanent. R.,341. The District Court noted that there was substantial evidence in the record to 
support each party's position, and, furthermore, sufficient evidence challenging the bias and 
credibility of the medical witnesses. R., 341. Likewise, the District Court observed that "[ c ]redible 
arguments can be and were made in support" of the parties' respective positions. R.,341. Because 
of the District Court's "unique position of having heard all of the testimony and examined all of the 
evidence," its "weighing ofthe evidence in a motion for new trial is given considerable discretion." 
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See Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho at 790,25 P.3d at 103. The mere fact that the Appellant thought 
her medical providers were more credible than Dr. Knoebel is irrelevant to the issue before this 
Court, which is whether the District Court abused its discretion in ruling that the jury's verdict was 
not against the clear weight of the evidence. The District Court's reasoning is solid. There was no 
abuse of discretion. 
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in addressing the second prong required when 
analyzing whether to grant a new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). The District 
Court considered whether a "new trial would produce a different result;" however, it could not rule 
that a new trial would change the result. R, 341; see Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho at 790, 25 
P.3d at 103. While the District Court astutely acknowledged that a different trial could reach a 
different result, it noted that the test was whether it would. R, 341. And having tried personal injury 
cases with facts similar to the one at issue here, the District Court stated that the results of those 
cases were "very similar" to the jury's verdict in the instant case. R, 341. The Trial Court did not 
abuse its discretion in declining to find that a new trial would produce a different result. 
C. The Court Should Denv Appellant's Request for Attornevs' Fees Pursuant to I.e. § 12-
121 and Instead Award Baumann Attorneys' Fees. 
The Appellant's request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 is ponderous, 
lacks merit and, as such, the Court should deny it. The gist of Appellant's argument is that the 
District Court's error in denying Appellant's motion for new trial was so obvious and so egregious 
that it was frivolous for Baumann not to wave a white flag and concede defeat. See LC. §12-121; 
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see also Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230,237,244 (2003). The speciousness of 
Appellants' contention is made clear by some simple facts. First, the jury did not agree with the 
Appellant's valuation ofthe case. Second, Baumann did not agree with Appellant's valuation ofthe 
case. 1 And third, the District Court did not agree with Appellant's valuation of the case. The same 
facts, however, are evidence that Appellant has pursued this appeal frivolously and 
such that an award ofIdaho Code § 12-121 attorneys' fees to Baumann is warranted. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Baumann respectfully urges this Court to affirm the District Court's Memorandum Opinion 
and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Additur and in the Alternative for a New TriaL 
Furthermore, Baumann requests that the Court deny Appellant's request for attorney's fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 12-121, and, instead, grant Baumann an award of attorney's fees pursuant to that 
statute. Baumann also requests costs incurred on appeal. 
Respectfully Submitted this __ day of May, 2012. 
Michael 
Attorney 
1 Recall that Baumann served a $25,000 dollar offer of judgment. 
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J HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2'1 day of May, 2012, two true and correct copies of 
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Eric R. Clark 
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